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Summary
The Department of the Navy (DoN) has several efforts underway to transform, or
change, U.S. naval forces and prepare them for future military challenges.  DoN officials
are generally satisfied with the scope and pace of their transformation efforts, but some
advocates of defense transformation are not and recommend that current efforts be
expanded and accelerated.  This report is intended particularly for Members and staffers
who cover defense issues, especially U.S. naval forces, defense technology, and long-
range military planning.  It will be updated as events warrant.
Introduction and Issue for Congress
This report focuses on the transformation of U.S. naval forces – the Navy and the
Marine Corps, which are both contained in the Department of the Navy (DoN).1  The issue
for Congress is whether the current DoN transformation efforts are sufficient, and if not,
what the options might be for accelerating or expanding these efforts.
Background
What is defense transformation?
Defense transformations are defined as infrequent, large-scale changes in weapons
and concepts of military operations that lead to major changes in the structure and
organization of military forces and the ways in which wars are fought.  In contrast to
incremental or evolutionary military change brought about by normal modernization
efforts, defense transformations are more likely to feature discontinuous or disruptive
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forms of change.  Such transformations are usually brought about by the emergence of key
new technologies that permit the creation of new kinds of military forces and approaches
to warfare.  By most accounts, there have been a few or several such transformations in
recent decades or centuries.  More recent examples that are sometimes cited include
Germany’s creation in the 1930s of the concept of rapid blitzkrieg-style warfare, and the
U.S. Navy’s creation at the same time of long-distance aircraft carrier-centered naval
warfare as a replacement for battleship-centered operations.
Some military analysts believe that recent new technologies – including advanced
information technologies (IT), distributed sensors, unmanned vehicles, and precision-
guided munitions – have set the stage for a new defense transformation.  They also believe
that U.S. military forces must transform themselves if they are to be adequately prepared
for 21st-Century military challenges, particularly so-called asymmetric challenges, in which
adversaries avoid competing head-on against current U.S. military strengths.
Transformation advocates believe that a key asymmetric challenge in the next 10 to
25 years will be the development of adversary military capabilities intended to prevent U.S.
military forces from gaining access to the ports, airfields, bases, staging areas, and littoral
(near-shore) sea areas that the United States now depends on to mount military operations
in distant military theaters.  Systems intended to counter U.S. naval forces in littoral areas
could include advanced diesel-electric submarines, mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, air-
defense systems, and – potentially – weapons of mass destruction.  Advocates believe that
U.S. military forces must transform themselves to successfully counter these so-called anti-
access or area-denial capabilities.  
Key transformation advocates include Andrew Marshall, the long-time director of
DoD’s Office of Net Assessment,2 Andrew Krepinevich, a protégé of Marshall’s who is
now the Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
(CSBA),3 and retired Navy Admiral William A. Owens.4
Bush Administration interest in defense transformation.
The Bush Administration has identified transformation as a major goal of its defense
policies and programs.  This goal was first articulated in a speech on defense policy given
by then-Governor Bush at the Citadel in South Carolina in September 1999, and has been
reiterated by the Administration on a number of occasions since January 2001, including
President Bush’s  remarks on defense policy at the Norfolk Naval Air Station (NAS) on
February 13, 2001.  On February 9, 2001, press reports revealed that the Administration
had selected Andrew Marshall to direct the strategy and forces element of the
Administration’s top-to-bottom review of U.S. defense policy and programs.
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Navy and Marine Corps transformation efforts.
The Navy and Marine Corps currently have several initiatives underway that they
describe as aimed at transforming U.S. naval forces.
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory.  The Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory (MCWL), earlier known as the Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory, is
arguably the first of DoN’s current major transformation initiatives.  Since 1995, the
MCWL, located at the Marine Corps base at Quantico, VA,  has directed a series of small-
and large-scale experimental exercises intended to explore new technologies and
operational concepts for the Marine Corps.  Technologies explored have ranged from less-
than-lethal weapons to small, man-portable unmanned air vehicles (UAVs).  Operational
concepts examined have ranged from tactics for rapidly penetrating  enemy coastal areas
with dispersed forces to new methods for carrying out military operations in urban areas.5
Navy Warfare Development Command.  In 1998, the Navy established the
Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), located at the Naval War College at
Newport, RI, to generate ideas for naval transformation and to act as a clearinghouse and
evaluator of ideas generated in other parts of the Navy.  The NWDC is now overseeing
a series of major fleet exercises, known as Fleet Battle Experiments (FBEs), that are
intended to explore potential new naval operational concepts.  (The Navy and Marine
Corps will also participate in transformation-oriented joint [multiservice] exercises directed
by the Joint Forces Command.)6 
Network-Centric Warfare.  The central concept underpinning current DoN
transformation efforts is network-centric warfare (NCW), also known as network-centric
operations (NCO), which entails using advanced information technologies (IT) to link
together personnel, ships, aircraft, and installations into a series of local- and wide-area
networks capable of rapidly transmitting critical information.  Many in DoN believe that
NCW will significantly increase U.S. naval capabilities and operational efficiency.  Key
NCW efforts include the Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) network for
air-defense operations, the IT-21 investment strategy, which is creating a corporate
intranet for Navy ships at sea, and the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), which is
creating a similar network to link together DoN installations.7
Streetfighter project.  The Streetfighter project, centered at the Naval War
College and led by Admiral Arthur Cebrowski (the President of the Naval War College and
an early promoter of NCW), is aimed at generating potential new naval capabilities and
operational concepts for fighting in littoral waters defended by anti-access/area-denial
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forces.  Streetfighter concepts are still evolving, but if implemented as currently
envisioned, Streetfighter forces could constitute a specialized 10 or 20 percent adjunct to
today’s main naval forces and would comprise three main elements – networks of small,
distributed sensors, unmanned vehicles to deploy them, and new kinds of ships, particularly
small and fast ships that might more effectively evade enemy targeting.
Other efforts.  In aviation, the Navy is seeking to increase the number of aim points
that an aircraft carrier can attack within a 24-hour period from a couple of hundred to
more than one thousand by combining an increased aircraft sortie rate with compact air-
launched munitions.  The Navy  is also developing a next-generation aircraft carrier called
the CVX,8 unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), and (with the Defense Advanced Research
Project Agency, or DARPA) a carrier-based unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV).
Surface-ship transformation efforts center on the Zumwalt (DD-21) class destroyer,
which will use automation to permit a much smaller crew than previous Navy surface
combatants, a new, low-visibility hull design, and advanced sensors and weapons,
including a new, longer-ranged gun for providing naval surface fire support.9   In addition,
the installation of theater-missile defense systems on Navy surface combatants will give
the Navy an ability to project a significant defensive capability inland.
Submarine transformation efforts include a Navy/DARPA project on submarine
payloads that has generated ideas for significantly expanding the number and variety of
weapons and sensors carried by Navy attack submarines.
The Navy also plans for the DD-21 and other future surface ships and submarines to
employ advanced electric-drive propulsion technology and integrated electric power
systems.10
Issues for Congress
Are current DoN transformation efforts sufficient?
One potential issue for Congress is whether current DoN transformation efforts are
sufficient in scope and urgency.  DoN officials and some Navy supporters appear generally
satisfied with current efforts.  They argue that U.S. naval forces as currently planned will
be able to defeat littoral anti-access/area-denial forces and thereby enable transformed Air
Force and Army forces to be deployed into the theater.  DoN officials acknowledge the
changed strategic environment and the potential to expand or accelerate current naval
CRS-5
11 For an additional discussion of options for implementing naval transformation, see O’Rourke,
Ronald.  Transformation and the Navy’s Tough Choices Ahead: What Are the Options for
Policymakers?  Naval War College Review, Winter 2001.
transformation efforts with additional funding.  But they argue that funding demands for
naval transformation need to be balanced against funding demands for readiness and for
near-term procurement to counter aging of weapons and equipment resulting from the
procurement “holiday” of the 1990s.
Advocates of defense transformation believe that current DoD transformation efforts
are inadequate and need to be substantially expanded and accelerated if U.S. forces are to
be adequately prepared to perform their missions 10 or 25 years from now.  They argue
that some efforts described by DoN officials as transformational are actually aimed at more
normal, incremental forms of change.  Transformation advocates question the future
survivability of aircraft carriers and other surface ships in heavily defended littoral waters.
Concern about ship survivability, they argue, could require U.S. naval forces to operate
much further from shore than currently planned, which in turn would raise questions about
the appropriateness of current DoN investment plans in various areas, including carrier-
based aircraft, naval surface fire support, and amphibious warfare.
Key questions for Congress regarding naval transformation include the following:
What is the current and projected anti-access/area-denial threat to U.S. naval forces
operating in littoral waters, and will U.S. naval forces under current DoN plans be able to
counter this threat both now and over the next 10 or 25 years?  Do current DoN plans take
optimal advantage of opportunities provided by new technologies for U.S. naval forces to
perform their missions in the most cost-effective manner?
What are the options for expanding naval transformation?
Should Congress choose to explore whether current DoN transformation efforts are
adequate, other questions would arise, including:  What are the options for expanding or
accelerating current naval transformation efforts?  The options below have been proposed
by transformation advocates as measures to accelerate DoN transformation generally or
to exploit specific technological opportunities for new weapons, particularly for countering
littoral anti-access/area-denial systems.11
Fleet Battle Exercises/experimental forces.  One option would be to expand
the Navy’s FBEs, incorporate them more fully into normal naval training operations, and
ensure that they are experimental undertakings rather than mere demonstrations of existing
capabilities.  Other options would be to create a standing naval experimental force for
testing new ideas without diverting regular Navy forces from their primary missions, or
to increase DoN participation in exercises conducted by the Joint Forces Command.
Streetfighter project.  Another option would be to expand the scope of the
Streetfighter project, which could involve adding funding for additional design and
engineering work and for acquisition and testing of specific near-term Streetfighter
proposals.  One such proposal is for a high-speed troop transport based on the design for
a civilian high-speed catamaran ferry now in operation.
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Alternative force architectures.  A related but more general option would be
to expand current DoN efforts to explore alternatives to the entire current U.S. naval fleet
architecture, which is the product of incremental, evolutionary development over the last
several decades.  Alternative architectures could involve new ship or aircraft designs and
new combinations of ships, aircraft, weapons, unmanned vehicles, and sensors.
Unmanned vehicles/netted sensors.  An additional option would be to expand
and accelerate the Navy’s current efforts for unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs),
UAVs, UCAVs, and netted sensors.  The Senate Armed Services Committee has
expressed strong interest in unmanned strike vehicles.
Submarine weapons and sensors.  Another option would be to pursue the
ideas generated by the Navy/DARPA submarine payloads program.  These ideas, if
implemented, could significantly transform the design and capabilities of U.S. submarines.
Trident SSGNs.  One more option would be to implement the proposal for
converting the 4 oldest Trident ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) into cruise-missile-
carrying submarines (SSGNs).  Congress has provided some funding to study the concept
and keep the option open.  Navy officials have stated that a decision on proposal must be
made this year because the ships are exhausting their current nuclear fuel cores and will
soon need to be either retired and or refueled, overhauled and converted into SSGNs.12
Arsenal ship.  Another possibility would be to revive the Navy/DARPA arsenal
ship program, begun in 1996 and canceled in 1997.  The arsenal ship would have been a
large, simple surface ship with a very small crew and a battery of about 500 cruise missiles.
The arsenal ship program was cited as an example of naval innovation in the Citadel
speech, but was not mentioned in the address at Norfolk NAS.13
Mobile offshore base.  Another approach would be to pursue the Mobile
Offshore Base (MOB), which would be a huge (up to about 5,000-foot-long) mobile,
floating platform composed of several large modules derived from designs for floating oil
platforms.  A MOB could be used to conduct air operations involving land-based aircraft
that require long runways, or as an at-sea base for supporting Army and Marine Corps
operations in distant theaters.  Congress and some of the services have shown some
interest in the MOB concept and have spent some funding on it in the past few years for
feasibility and preliminary design and engineering studies.
